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This short piece attempts to identify the origins of the Teaching Excellence Framework 
(TEF), to locate it within the wider framework of policy for higher education (HE) in the UK - 
more specifically England - to identify characteristics that will endure whatever tinkering at 
the edges happens as a result of the trial and error approach adopted towards many issues 
in contemporary politics, including the REF (McNay, 2016), which can be seen as a 
reference point for what we can anticipate. Government acknowledges that the approach will 
be applied to TEF: ‘we will continue to trial and pilot changes to ensure that the framework 
continues to improve’ (Department for Education, 2016, paragraph 7) 
The basic principle is that HE is seen as a business, operating in a competitive market, with 
universities described as ‘service delivery agents’ by one senior civil servant, and students, 
as customers, put ‘at the heart of the system’. Since government no longer funds teaching, 
except to top up costs of expensive essentials in STEM subjects, it is no longer a near 
monopoly client controlling through resource allocation policy, but has re-shaped itself as a 
students’ champion, a blend of the Consumers’ Association, sponsors of the Which? Guide 
to universities, and the Competition and Markets Authority, monitoring probity in provision 
and publicity. Its agent for this will be the new Office for Students, which at least is within the 
education ministry, not business, where research remains. 
The secondary principles underpin traditional Conservative attitudes since the collapse of 
Butskellism: 
- value for money – as in economy, efficiency, effectiveness, in that order; 
- a belief, if applied to higher education, demonstrated to be mistaken by Gareth 
Williams as long ago as 1992, that competition enhances quality and reduces costs 
(Williams, 1992); that is also false for other sectors as currently evidenced by 
prisons, forensic services, energy companies and transport provision. So, Jo 
Johnson (DBIS, 2015) thinks that new providers should be able to award their own 
degrees as soon as they open their doors – the level playing field syndrome - 
because such [unproven] ‘high quality challenger institutions… will add a positive 
competitive dynamic’ to the sector (Havergal, 2016a). That was the argument behind 
the polytechnics, and later the Open University, but they had a much long 
probationary period – the OU had an academic advisory committee for 6 years 
before operating with full autonomy; 
- a suspicion of professionals as autonomous ‘experts’, particularly those in public 
service, whose first loyalty should be to the state as employer, and compliance with 
its views, recently seen in attitudes to the judiciary supporting elective democracy 
within the Brexit process, and, ironically, ‘service providers’ in the central civil service 
and embassies world-wide. 
Value for money promoting efficiency, and accountability, curbing autonomy, were the initial 
drivers behind what has become the REF, to monitor whether academic professionals in the 
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universities of that era were doing what they were paid to do - research. Many were not. The 
RQA/RAE/REF then conditioned the award of funds for research and distorted strategic and 
resource support away from teaching, still the second main expenditure across the HE 
sector, after administration. Before fees were re-introduced (they existed when I was a 
student in the mid-1960s) only four HEIs out of nearly 150 got more money from government 
for research than for teaching. The dominant discourse later became that teaching in HE 
was of poor quality because of government emphasis on research, though that causal link 
was denied. The White Paper (BIS, 2015) expresses a ‘concern that too often the incentive 
at an institutional and individual level skews activity away from teaching’ – with no 
acceptance of government responsibility for setting those incentives. We are to blame for a 
negative policy impact I identified for HEFCE 20 years ago (McNay, 1997), and which it 
acknowledged then. Bahram Bekhradnia, formerly the boss of HEFCE - which funded HE 
and had a duty to ensure quality - was more generally critical in saying that universities are 
‘not very good at teaching’. He drew on various comparative projects across Europe and the 
wider world (Havergal, 2015). That may have been true in the Russell Group universities, as 
evidenced by a trial TEF run by Times Higher Education (THE), which put none in the top 
ten (Havergal, 2016b) and had several well into the bottom half of the league table - Bristol, 
King’s College, London (KCL), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 
Goldsmiths, St. Andrews, Edinburgh were all ranked below Greenwich. Senior managers 
attributed this to the impact of REF – the Research Excellence Framework, a government 
policy, but with academics being blamed – and the solution seen as replicating that 
approach for assessing teaching excellence, when many academics believe that the REF 
and its antecedents have had significant negative impact (McNay, 1997, 2007, 2016) . The 
2016 HEPI academic experience survey showed that student satisfaction is in decline and 
student assessment of value for money fell steeply, by 20 percentage points in England 
since fees were last trebled – another government policy (Neves and Hillman, 2016). It is 
worth noting that the THE survey of academic staff (Grove, 2017) showed that 39 per cent 
agreed that teaching was the most important function of a scholar, with only 24 per cent 
disagreeing. The same survey showed that 55 per cent of academic respondents believed 
that research is valued more highly than teaching in their institution. So, leaders and 
managers are also culpable, but not the teachers now being frameworked. 
The motivations driving entry to the REF were described by one of my favourite ex-vice-
chancellors as ‘fame and fortune’ – esteem and funding, thereby combining intrinsic and 
extrinsic elements. This will also apply to TEF which will have a ranking and a reward. But, 
with a difference – politicians do learn, but slowly. The ranking will be initially at corporate 
level; and the reward will be paid by the students in even higher fees, or by teachers 
because managers will be allowed to increase student numbers. Recruitment of international 
students will also be conditional on a good grade. Those factors mean that 134 HEIs, mainly 
in England, where the policy operates are taking part in year 2 of the exercise, despite their 
staff’ attitudes, as Stuart Croft, VC of Warwick acknowledged in a letter to THE on 2 
February, 2017, where his argument was simple: ‘the government has us over a barrel’. 
Officially, in England, there is no cap on numbers, but that may not last long when the size of 
the 18+age cohort expands rapidly soon after the start of the next decade. However, that will 
be balanced by leaving the EU and losing the obligation of give loans to people from 27 
other countries, delighting the Thatcherites. Conditions of student financial support have 
become harsher and data on the ‘graduate premium’ suggest it is declining, also 
acknowledged by government (DBIS, 2015) so the calculation about whether to enter HE 
may change with the limit to numbers emerging from decisions by potential students. 
The other value for money lesson learned from REF is about the cost of the evaluation 
exercise itself. There has long been pressure to reduce peer assessment in REF and use 
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metrics as the dominant evidence base for quality. For TEF, the search was for existing 
metrics, because there is not a tradition of peer review within politicians’ living memories. 
Some of us may be nostalgic for the Council for National Academic Awards, which validated 
polytechnic degrees, with its formative, developmental approach. Even Teaching Quality 
Assessment, the last experiment in this field, involved visits, observation and discussion as 
well as rooms full of paperwork, but it cost a lot to find very, very little to criticise: not the 
government expectation, so it was abandoned. 
Government acknowledges that there are no good metrics, but they are prepared to use bad 
ones, or proxies, to get something done, with, initially, little flexibility from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
core (Department for Education, 2016) beyond socio-economic background of students, and 
an institutional submission to stake a claim for excellence against institutional benchmarks. 
The chair of the TEF panel acknowledges that all data are flawed in some respect, 
especially those from the National Student Survey which are corrupted by student self-
interest in rating highly the quality of their university and where 25 student unions are 
committed to a boycott because of the impact on TEF ratings (Grove, 2017a). 
There are some positives for universities that value teaching – greater parity of status 
between teaching and research careers, with explicit career paths and rewards for teaching, 
which may redress the distorting imbalance that has developed. The three main metrics 
concern teaching quality, learning environment, student outcomes and learning gains (DBIS, 
2015, chapter 3). Teaching quality will use student satisfaction statistics, which risks 
popularity displacing quality, with negative effects. Learning gain is notoriously difficult to 
measure; some pilot, unpublished, work on this I did with John Platt showed Oxbridge 
students had a learning loss, given that their high entry qualifications were not matched by 
high degree classification. Teaching excellence may be related to contact hours and student 
time spent studying as well as, possibly, the proportion of staff on permanent contracts. 
Study time depends on self-reporting, not a reliable process. Outcomes will use leaver 
destination statistics to measure high level skills development to promote social mobility and 
enhance productivity. The consultation showed only about 40 per cent of respondents 
supported several government proposals on this, but they will be retained despite that 
(Department of Education, 2016, paragraph 38). However, the quantifiable metric is salary, 
and recent HESA stats have shown that salaries in law are related to family background of 
students on entry. They will also vary by the differences between working in family law and 
corporate law, so skewing the advice given to students. HESA stats also show that the job 
market is institutionally racist and sexist, something often hidden by treating employment 
and further study as a single metric, when the second may be a fall-back after prejudiced 
decisions on the former. HEIs do, though, need to examine why black students on average 
gain lower final degree classifications than others with the same entry qualifications. 
The report on responses to the consultation raises issues about ideological drivers for 
proposals to support new market entrants. There were responses from 132 ‘state’ HEIs, of 
which 18 are quoted in the text; private alternative providers, including for profit 
organisations with foreign owners provided 21 responses with 8 quoted. In percentage 
terms, that is a quotation rate of 13 per cent and 38 per cent, three times as many for new 
entrants encouraged by government as for established HEIs. For student unions, 
representing those ‘at the heart of the system’, the rate is even worse: three quoted from 35 
responses: 8.6 per cent. (Department of Education, 2016). In the end, only six alternative 
providers will take part in full this year (HEFCE, 2017), despite government sponsorship of 
them as high quality entrants. 
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The RAE/REF has shown that any metrics adopted will be ‘gamed’. My work (McNay, 2016) 
has shown that research approaches become less innovative, more conformist to fit with 
perceived assessment panel prejudices. Hardly, then, an approach to encourage 
developments and diversity in teaching and learning: another unexpected negative 
consequence, moving authority to managers and away from academic professionals. The 
professionals do not think the TEF will achieve its aims. In the THE survey only four per cent 
of academics thought that the proposed framework will accurately assess teaching quality, 
with 75 per cent saying it will not. Similarly, 12 per cent believe it will improve quality, with 64 
per cent saying it will not. Administrators were equally sceptical (Grove, 2017b). The record 
of institutional strategic leaders is not good: when high fees for taught courses came in, the 
extra funding was taken from teaching departments to spend on central marketing, and 
iconic buildings, not invested in the teaching process. Yet students’ top priority for savings, if 
needed, is…buildings (HEA/HEPI, 2016; Jones et al, 2016). TEF may see a transfer of funds 
from teaching departments to internal employment agencies, given a racist employment 
market. I know of one HEI that reduced its intake of BME students, as part of a tactic of 
raising its UCAS entry tariff, so as to improve its league table position. TEF plans are to 
reward widening access to counteract that, as part of a wider aim to double numbers of 
disadvantaged entrants, but that is hardly an indicator of teaching excellence at that stage, 
and is not affected by the quality of teaching staff activity. 
So, there is confusion, lack of clarity, but, as with research, emergent greater control. There 
is discontinuity built in: such uncertainty risks loss of innovation and creativity essential to 
quality improvement. As with the impact criterion for research quality, an aim of TEF is to 
change behaviour (DBIS, 2015). That change may be towards compliance, conformity and 
convergence to an isomorphic range of provision.  At least we have been warned. I have 
tried to indicate what to expect, but, expect the unexpected as well. As one head of HEFCE 
said about the RAE: ‘You never know how it will all turn out’ (McNay, 1998). 
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